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Abstract 
The paper sheds new light on John Bates Clark’s mature position on the “trust” issue. 
Access to previously unpublished 1911 testimony before the Interstate Commerce 
Committee of the U.S. Senate, it is shown that, although Clark relied generally on 
competitive forces to keep monopoly power in check, following the Standard Oil and 
American Tobacco cases of that year, he lost considerable faith in the power of his concept 
of “potential competition,” or latent competition that may or may not be realized. What he 
advocates here is government promotion of actual competition, largely through the 
dissolution of the “perilous” trusts and the development of a common pricing policy where 
all producers face the same price regimes in both the output and input markets. What is 
desired as an outcome is the promotion of what Clark terms “tolerant competition.” Tolerant 
competition is not the perfect competition of the neoclassical model, nor the rough-and-
ready competition of the pre-1870 era. Rather, it is a live-and-let-live form of competition 
where big firms and small firms face the same pricing conditions and only efficiency 
determines the profit outcome. 
 
Public concern over the so called “trust problem” in the United States between the end of the 
nineteenth century and 1914, the year of the passage of the Clayton Act, was reflected in the 
considerable contemporary literature on the subject. Not surprisingly, professional economists 
actively participated to this debate. Their thinking directly and indirectly influenced the legislation 
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of 1914 in a way that cannot be said of the Sherman Act of 1890 (Mayhew, 1998)1. A survey of the 
most important of these professional writings shows that, among the several voices which animated 
the discussion, John Bates Clark’s was perhaps the most influential. In this connection, Joseph 
Dorfman argues that John Bates Clark’s second edition of his Control of Trusts (1912), co-authored 
with his son John Maurice, “played a formative historical role in policy making, for it provided the 
most systematic exposition of the view on trusts, that was embodied in 1914, at President Woodrow 
Wilson’s urging, in the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.” “From this 
standpoint,” continues Dorfman quite emphatically, “The Control of Trusts caught the dominant 
reform interest and in turn become a contributing force in shaping the trend of the socio-economic 
development of the nation.” (Dorfman 1971, 17). Apart from the 1912 monograph, John Bates 
Clark devoted considerable attention to the problems of trusts and industrial combinations during 
much of his career, both in his professional writings and in his frequent contributions to newspapers 
and popular reviews. 
Dorfman in his introduction to the reprint of the second edition of The Control of Trusts 
provides lengthy evidence of correspondence in 1914 between Clark and Senator Francis Newlands, 
a prime mover in the development of the both the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts. 
This is interesting because it shows that Clark and Newlands got in touch after 1911 and that 
Senator Newlands relied on Clark’s opinion about “three tentative bills (one of which would 
become the Clayton Act) enclosed with your letter.”  
The aim of this note is to introduce unpublished testimony given by John Bates Clark before 
the Interstate Commerce Committee of the Senate in 1911.2 
                                                 
1 As early as in 1915, commenting on the passage of the Clayton Act, Allyn Young observed: “Furthermore, it is 
significant that in much of the more serious discussion, both the analysis of the problem and the proposals of the 
specific remedies involved the recognition of certain principles that for some years had been very generally accepted 
among economists. Specific instances of the direct influence of economic writing and teaching have not been lacking, 
and it is fair to infer that through a process of gradual diffusion the indirect influence has been considerable.” (Young 
1915, 204). 
2  The transcript of the testimony is found in the Rare Book and Manuscript Room, Columbia University. 
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What Happened in 1911? 
The 1911 oil and tobacco cases were the most important pre-1914 cases concerning the legality of 
combinations brought about by either stock or asset acquisition, and substantially contributed to the 
demand for for the passage of the Clayton Act. The American Tobacco Company was primarily the 
result of a series of asset acquisitions, although it also involved the acquisition of competitors’ 
stock. The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey was primarily a combination brought about as a 
holding company by the acquisition of stock. The goverment won both cases, thus demonstrating 
that under the Sherman Act a combination of manufacturing concerns could be dissolved, whether 
organized under the corporate form as a holding company or as a single corporation. The most 
important aspect of these decisions was that the defendants were found to have violated the 
Sherman Act not because of a restraint of trade, but because of an unreasonable restraint of trade. 
On the basis of the principle of the “rule of reason,” the government could establish that restraint of 
trade had indeed occurred. The defendant could then argue that such restraint was “reasonable.” 
Clearly, in these cases the defendants were unsuccessful in their bid to demonstrate that their 
activities were of a reasonable sort. (See Liebhafsky, 1971, 265-9 for an elaboration of this principle 
with regard to the above cases.) 
The 1911 Supreme Court ruling against the American Tobacco Company and the Standard 
Oil Company clarified state economic policy concerning actions of a holding company. Both trusts 
used the pyramided holding company to control several subsidiary corporations and gain market 
control. The court held that the pyramided structure of the American Tobacco constituted 
“unreasonable restraint of trade.” These decisions showed that “…the state was becoming more 
concerned about the use of the pyramided corporate structure to gain market control than about 
market control per se. It was the ability of corporations to control markets by controlling the assets 
subsidiaries they did not fully own that the state managers found problematic” (Prechel, 2000, 64). 
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The relevance of the 1911 cases did not pass unnoticed by prominent economists in the field 
of trusts. In 1912, The Journal of Political Economy devoted two issues, 4 and 5, and much of 
number 6 to the so-called trust problem. In that same year, the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science devoted its Annal to the topic of “Industrial Competition and Combination.” 
Included in this volume was an essay by Clark on “The Possibility of Competition in Commerce 
and Industry.” Two representative statements follow. It should be noted that Henry Seager was a 
fellow Columbia University economist and personal friend of Clark, while Jeremiah Jenks was 
perhaps the most noted industrial organization economist of his day. 
 
 The recent decisions [Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases] will exert an important 
influence on future developments in three different directions. (1) They constitute 
precedents for future decisions. (2) They should contribute toward that clearer formulation 
of public policy with reference to combinations and corporations engaged in interstate 
commerce that is one of the most urgent duties now resting on the Congress of the United 
States. (3) They must affect the forms of organization which the business of the country will 
assume in future years. 
It is one of the disappointing aspects of the decisions that they fail to answer clearly 
the question which just now most vitally concerns the business community, namely, how far 
does the statute as interpreted by the court go in its condemnation of great industrial 
combinations? To present the problem concretely: is the United States Steel Corporation a 
combination in restraint of trade in the statutory sense or not? I have read with care the 
reasons given in the decisions for condemning the Standard Oil Company and the American 
Tobacco Company, and I must confess my inability to give a confident answer to this 
question….  
The influence which the decisions will have on the forms of business organization to 
be adopted in the future depends very largely on the promptness and statesmanship which 
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Congress may display in working out a regulative policy for industrial combinations…. 
Under a wise regulative policy it is probable that many different forms of organization 
would flourish side by side. At the same time protection from unfair and oppressive methods 
of competition would be a great encouragement to the small producer and would enable him 
to regain some of the ground he has lost in the unequal competition he has frequently been 
compelled to carry on with the unregulated trust…(Seager, 1911, pp. 611-14). 
 
The essential purpose of this paper, however, is not to suggest remedies, but rather to call 
attention to what seems to the fact, that the Supreme Court in these two decisions has failed 
to take sufficiently into account the economic benefits that come from the saving of 
industrial energy and the promotion of industrial efficiency by industrial combination….It is 
submitted that a method of procedure should be found, either by the legislative departments 
of by the courts, that, while protecting the public interest from direct harm, shall serve the 
public interest by keeping the benefits of combinations (Jenks, 1912, 357). 
 
A Consequence of the 1911 Cases: 
Reactions to the 1911 court decisions were not limited to the economics community; these cases 
had important consequences in the larger political arena as well. The Interstate Commerce 
Committee of the Senate, of which Democrat Senator Albert Cummins was Chairman, called for an 
inquiry into the whole of antitrust law, an inquiry whose hearings lasted from November of 1911 
into the following spring. In his insightful and well documented historical reconstruction of the 
events prompted by this inquiry, William Letwin tells us that lengthy testimony was taken from 
over one hundred experts in the field, including leading businessmen such as the steel tycoons 
Andrew Carnegie and James A. Farrell; lawyers who had been serving as consultants in previous 
antitrust cases such as Victor Morawets and Louis D. Brandeis; labor leaders and public affair 
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specialists such as Samuel Gompers and Lyman Abbott; and eminent economists such as J. 
Lawrence Laughlin and John Bates Clark. 
 
“From these men the Senate Committee had taken testimony on all the many particular 
proposals for amending the antitrust law. It had heard suggestions ranging from the total 
abandonment of the Sherman Act to the strenghtening of the act by attaching to it long lists 
of prohibited practices and long glossaries defining for the courts its essential terms” 
(Letwin 1965, 268). 
 
The Place of J.B. Clark 
J. B. Clark was arguably the most prominent U.S. economist by the turn of the twentieth century. 
Best known for his 1899 The Distribution of Wealth, Clark was also one of the more important 
authorities on issues associated with “the trusts.” Writing in some of the popular outlets of the day 
as well as in the professional journals, Clark also wrote for The Independent, a religious monthly 
associated with the Social Gospel movement. As well, he contributed two books, The Control of 
Trusts (1901 that was revised in 1912 with his son, John Maurice Clark as co-author), and The 
Problem of Monopoly (1904) that was based on a Cooper Union, New York lecture series. By the 
time of the 1911 testimony, Clark was a well known industrial organization economist and was well 
placed to add to the information being compiled by the Senate Committee. 
Clark was not a “trust-buster” in the tradition of Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive 
Movement that was so prominent in the first two decades of the century. Rather, he took the 
position that trusts (or oligopolistic organizations in general) were a “natural” phenomenon and 
were simply the outcome of technological change coupled to increasing returns to scale that could 
be captured by large industrial organizations (Clark, 1900). The contest was not between big and 
small business but “honest” and “dishonest” capital. Honest capital secures gains through advancing 
technology, thus increasing productivity and reducing costs—a benefit to consumers—while 
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dishonest capital is garnered through speculation, financial manipulation, and assorted other 
nefarious activities. Proper policy, then, is to assure that the efficiency gains based on scale are 
preserved, while pricing power based solely on size is reduced or eliminated. (For all this and what 
follows, see Henry, 1995, 117-26.) 
In the final analysis, Clark generally saw government policy as ineffectual, mainly because 
of bureaucratic problems, but also because it would be difficult, if not impossible, for officials to 
discover the true, competitive price based on costs of production and which would be necessary to 
establish the “correct” price large firms should charge. Moreover, if government were to intervene 
in the pricing decision, this would no doubt stifle technological change as it would interfere with 
firms’ search for profit. His fundamental solution to the problem of monopoly was “potential 
competition,” a concept developed as early as 1890 in his “The ‘Trust’: A New Agent for Doing an 
Old Work.” Essentially, potential competition is that which would develop if monopolies actually 
used their economic power to raise prices much above the competitive level. Were this to happen, 
new competitors would appear to take advantage of the higher profits associated with monopoly 
pricing and this would force price down to the near-competitive level. In other words, if we do not 
observe entry into a particular industrial field, existing large corporations are not unduly exercising 
pricing power. 
 
A quarter of a century ago, when the power of the trusts was beginning to show itself, and 
the natural limits on the exercise of that power had not appeared, the public had a period of 
positive alarm. It knew then that the trusts were greedy, but did not know that it was fatal to 
themselves to be too greedy. The monopolies quickly found this out to their cost…and 
everyone now knows that “potential competition”…the competition of the mill that is not 
yet built but will be built if the trust becomes too extortionate—holds these commercial 
monsters in check. 
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If the trust raise prices too much, new mills are actually built and prices go down; therefore 
it does not put the prices high enough to call the new mills into being. It is deterred from 
much extortion which…it would otherwise practice by the competitors who do not now exist 
(Clark, 1904, 955-6).  
 
While Clark relied generally on competitive forces to keep monopoly power in check, he was not a 
strict laissez faire economist (and certainly not in favour of nationalization or socialism).3 He did 
see limited scope for government intervention, in particular in those cases where monopolies sold 
below cost to drive out a rival, where monopoly firms producing various varieties and qualities of a 
good would charge a lower price for a particular variety sold by the smaller firm, and where 
“factors agreements,” where firms forced merchants to refuse to purchase a rival’s product, were in 
effect. The one area where Clark did call for fairly strenuous government regulation was railroads. 
As railroads serve all industries and no close substitutes for their services exist, government should 
exercise its regulatory hand in administering prices, though in a rather interesting fashion. Pools 
should be facilitated in which the various companies would agree upon a common price, divide 
markets among themselves, and eliminate competition. The cartelized price would be higher than 
that of a competitive industry, to be sure, but it would be public knowledge. Secret price 
agreements, the bane of consumers of railroad services, would be eliminated and government would 
then have a much simpler job in regulating that price to a closer proximity of the competitive 
standard. 
In his 1911 testimony, one can observe all the above arguments represented, but there is one 
subtle difference from his previously articulated positions. In the then-current period, the force of 
potential competition has lessened—“dishonest” capital has grown stronger. What is necessary is 
                                                 
3 In 1928, Clark was invited to participate in New York Governor Alfred E. Smith’s campaign for the presidency. In a 
letter sent by Franklin D. Roosevelt on behalf of Smith, the appeal to Clark is made largely on the basis of  Smith’s 
humanitarian impulses (equated to those of Woodrow Wilson) against the “crass materialism” of Herbert Hoover and 
his associates. John Maurice Clark, in a letter to Dorfman, notes that his father, while clearly not a socialist, was a 
believer in a “new deal, welfare capitalism” (J. M. Clark to Joseph Dorfman, 1958). 
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government promotion of actual competition, largely through dissolution of the “perilous” trusts (to 
be distinguished from those labelled “harmless”) and the development of a common pricing policy 
where all producers face the same price regimens in both the output and input markets. What is 
necessary is the promotion of what Clark terms “tolerant competition.”  Tolerant competition is not 
the perfect competition of the neoclassical model, nor the rough-and-ready competition of the pre-
1870 era. Rather, it’s a live-and-let-live form of competition where big firms and small firms face 
the same pricing conditions and only efficiency determines the profit outcome. While the honest 
trust may well win this contest, such an outcome is not assured. Both large and small producer 
would face the same external constraints and both (or either) would succeed based upon their ability 
to advantage themselves through gains in efficiency. 
 
A Note on Clark and the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts 
In the early part of the century, there was much concern in various quarters regarding the 
uncertainties and vagaries embodied in the Sherman (antitrust) Act of 1890. In particular, large 
business concerns desired much firmer guidelines as to what constituted restraints on trade and on 
the determination of what sorts of activities were legal. Various bills, sponsored by business 
organizations and designed to promote greater federal regulation of the economy in business 
interests were brought before Congress, but to no avail. On January 20, 1914, President Wilson, 
speaking before both houses of government, articulated the issue very clearly: 
 
The business of the country awaits also, has long awaited and has suffered because it could 
not obtain, further and more explicit legislative definition of the policy and meaning of the 
existing anti-trust law. Nothing hampers business like uncertainty…. And the businessmen 
of the country desire something more than that the menace of legal process in these matters 
be made explicit and intelligible. They desire the advice, the definite guidance, and 
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information which can be supplied by and administrative body, and interstate trade 
commission (in Kolko, 260). 
 
As noted above, J. B. Clark had long been active in the theoretical debates surrounding the “trusts.” 
By the second decade of the 1900’s, he became involved at the political level. Indeed, following his 
1911 testimony, he co-authored a 1913 Bill sponsored by the National Civic Foundation, the 
leading big business organization of the day, proposing a seven-person interstate trade commission 
with fairly broad powers, including the fining of corporations (minimally, to be sure) for violations 
of existing law. This bill was a precursor of the 1914 Federal Trade Commission Act that was 
passed in concert with the Clayton Act of that year. 
What is thus demonstrated is that Clark was important in the development of anti-trust 
legislation in the U.S., not just at the theoretical level, but also at the practical, political level. This 
is in keeping with his ongoing concern with the major issues of his day and his application of the 
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